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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
BRANDON J. WILSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 46775-2019
SHOSHONE COUNTY NO. CR40-18-985

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brandon Wilson appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). As such, this Court should
either reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or, alternatively, vacate the order denying his
Rule 35 motion and remand this case for further proceedings.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Wilson is suffering under a terminal cancer diagnosis. (Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.18-19; Tr., p.38, L.21 - p.39, L.7.) 1 He moved to Calder, Idaho,
because there was a spot by the river where he wanted to spend his final days.

(Tr., p.39,

Ls. I-7.) During that time, Mr. Wilson and his wife got into an extended argument, and it became
physical. 2 (R., pp.10-11.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Wilson ultimately entered an Alford
plea to one count of aggravated battery causing traumatic injury. 3 (R., p.70; Tr., p.8, L.14 - p.9,
L. 7.) Mr. Wilson also agreed to waive his right to appeal the conviction and initial imposition of
sentence. 4 (R., p.70.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all the charges in another pending
case and to dismiss or not file a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., p.70.)

Sentencing

recommendations were left open. (R., p.70.)
The PSI recommended the district court retain jurisdiction, given Mr. Wilson's conduct
in this case and his criminal history. (PSI, pp.3, 23.) At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel
argued that most of Mr. Wilson's significant criminal history was old, and that it did not include
any prior instances of domestic violence. (Tr., p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.2; see generally PSI, pp.6-14
(showing Mr. Wilson's last felony conviction was in 1994 and the few subsequent felony
charges have all been dismissed, as have most of the subsequent misdemeanor charges).)
Accordingly, defense counsel recommended the district court impose a sentence of local jail
1

To avoid confusion, "PSI" refers to the electronic document "Appeal Volume 1 - Exhibits
PSR" and uses the electronic page numbers. "Tr." refers to the volume containing the transcripts
of the change of plea and sentencing hearings contained in the file "Appeal Amended Transcript
Appeal.pd£" "Aug. Tr." refers to the volume containing the transcript of the hearing on
Mr. Wilson's Rule 35 motion, contained in the file "Wilson Rule 35.pdf"
2
He was alleged to have broken his wife's jaw during the fight. (R., pp .10-11.)
3
Mr. Wilson noted that the prosecutor had argued his cancer diagnosis as a justification for
denying him bail. (PSI, pp.18-19; see R., p.62.)
4
The plea agreement does not include a waiver of the right to file a Rule 35 motion or appeal
from the decision on such a motion. (See generally R., p.70.)
2

time, so as to allow Mr. Wilson to have the ability to see his family as his condition progressed.
(Tr., p.39, Ls.14-18.)

He also explained that, while Mr. Wilson's diagnosis limited the

traditional value of retaining jurisdiction, it would still be a worthwhile option for other reasons.
(Tr., p.39, Ls.20 - p.40, L.6.)

The prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Wilson had accepted

responsibility for his conduct and had expressed an amenability to treatment.

(Tr., p.35,

Ls.20-23.) Given all the facts, he agreed a rider would be appropriate, but, given the victim
impact statement, he ultimately recommended the district court impose and execute a four-year
sentence, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.35, L.24 - p.36, L.2, p.36, L.20 - p.37, L.7.)
The district court exceeded all the sentencing recommendations and imposed and
executed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, instead. (Tr., p.44, Ls.12-14.)
Mr. Wilson filed a Rule 35 motion timely from the resulting judgment of conviction. (R., pp.77,
86.) He argued the sentence "would cause undue hardship" and, therefore, should be reduced in
the interests of justice. 5 (R., p.86.) The State objected, arguing the sentence was not excessive
and was not supported by new or additional evidence. (R., p.101.) A hearing was ultimately
scheduled on that motion.
At that hearing, defense counsel explained the district court should consider granting
leniency based on "everything in the PSR and his very bleak physical prognosis; kind of a
terminal case of cancer, and he wants you to reconsider those again." (Aug. Tr., p.4, Ls.19-23.)
The prosecutor argued the sentence was appropriate and that the district court had been aware of
Mr. Wilson's diagnosis at the initial sentencing hearing.

5

(Aug. Tr., p.5, Ls.1-12.)

The

The motion initially included an assertion that the district court had not awarded credit for time
served. (R., p.86.) However, at the ensuing hearing, defense counsel clarified "he's not claiming
an illegality in the judgment. He's just saying he wants you to reconsider in terms of leniency."
(Aug. Tr., p.4, Ls.17-20.)
3

prosecutor also asserted he was not sure what relevance Mr. Wilson's diagnosis had to the
district court's sentencing decision. 6 (Aug. Tr., p.5, Ls.6-8.)
The district court denied Mr. Wilson's motion on its merits. (Aug. Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.6,
L.4.) Specifically, it explained that, given the violent nature of the crime and Mr. Wilson's prior
record, the sentence addressed the goals of deterrence, retribution, and protection of society.
(Aug. Tr., p.5, L.24 - p.6, L.3.) It did not discuss the goal of rehabilitation in its explanation of
the sentence. (See generally Aug. Tr.) Mr. Wilson had already filed a notice of appeal in this
case, and the Supreme Court augmented that appeal with the order denying his Rule 35 motion.
(Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated Aug. 2, 2019.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Wilson's Rule 35 motion.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wilson's Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe in light of new or additional
information presented to the sentencing court. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007); see
also Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (articulating the appellate
standard for reviewing for abuses of discretion).

6

As such, when petitioning for a sentence

See, e.g., State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that the
defendant's poor health is a relevant factor for the district court to consider when ruling on a
motion for reduction of sentence); accord State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 636 (Ct. App. 2001)
(finding no abuse of discretion when the district court considered the defendant's poor health in
mitigation, as a reason to not follow the State's recommended sentence).
4

reduction under Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information presented to the sentencing court. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.
“The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). The protection of society is the primary objective the court should
consider when imposing a sentence.

Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that

rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court should consider to achieve that goal.
See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v.
Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164 Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018)
(noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a sentence of incarceration, if that
is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of sentencing). Additionally, while the district
court may place significant weight on one of the goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can
ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the other goals as being insignificant or unimportant.
See, e.g., State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently
consider various mitigating factors has resulted in abuses of sentencing discretion in several
cases).
Mindful of Huffman’s requirement to present new or additional information, Mr. Wilson
contends the district court abused its discretion by not granting his Rule 35 motion for the
reasons articulated by trial counsel below.

5

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the order denying his Rule 35
motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 25 th day of October, 2019.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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